In this papel; we formally define these specijic privacypreserving cooperative computation problems, and present protocols to solve them.
Introduction
The growth of the Internet has triggered tremendous opportunities for cooperative computation, in which multiple parties need to jointly conduct computation tasks based on the private inputs they each supply. These computations could occur between mutually untrusted parties, or even between competitors. For example, two competing financial organizations might jointly invest in a project that must satisfy both organizations' private and valuable constraints. Today, to conduct such a computation, one must -usually know inputs from all the participants; however if nobody can be trusted enough to know all the inputs, privacy will become a primary concern. For example, consider the following applications:
Two financial organizations plan to cooperatively work on a project for mutual benefit. Each of the organizations would like its own requirements being satisfied (usually, these requirements are modeled as linear equations). How- ever, the requirements includes their projects of the likely future evolution of certain commodity prices, interest and inflation rates, economic statistics, and customers' portfolio holdings. These are valuable proprietary data that nobody is willing to disclose to other parties, or even to a "trusted" third party. How could these two financial organizations cooperate on this project?
Two companies A and B are investigating an opportunity for a partnership. Company A's goal is to optimize the cost of a manufacturing process. As part of the partnership, company B will conduct part of the process. Because of this, A does not know B's constraints on that part of the process, unless B tells A, nor does B know A's constraints. Usually, the constraints reflect the information about the company's resource, strategic plans, cost information, and business decisions. They are so critical that both companies try every measure to protect them. Considering that the partnership is not formed yet, B is afraid that, if the partnership eventually falls through, the information it provides to A might be used by A for B's disadvantage. With such a concern, B really does not feel comfortable to give its information to any other company, neither does A. How could these two companies find out the benefit of a potential partnership without *Portions of this work were supported by Grant EIA-9903545 from the National Science Foundation, and by sponsors of the Center for Education and Research in Information Assurance and Security.
The above examples, without the privacy concerns, risking their private information '? could usually be modeled as linear systems of equations problems or linear least squares problems [ 151. These scientific computation problems have proved valuable for modeling many and diverse types of problems in planning, routing, scheduling, assignment, and design. Industries that make use of these problems and their extensions include banking, transportation, energy, telecommunications, and manufacturing of many kinds. Although these problems have been well studied in the literature, their current solutions rarely extend to the situation in which multiple parties want to jointly conduct the computations based on the private inputs. For instance, Alice has k linear equations in n unknown variables x i ; Bob has n -k linear equations in the same n unknown xi. Alice and Bob want to find the solution ( X I , . . . , 2,) that satisfies the combined n linear equations.
We know how to solve the problem if Alice can give her equations to Bob or vice versa, because it is just a normal linear system of equations problem. However, if the equations owned by each party are so valuable proprietary data that neither party is willing to disclose to the other, the problem can no longer be solved using the traditional methods, such as Gaussian elimination and LU factorization, because these methods assume that one who conducts the computation knows all the inputs, an assumption that is not true any more in the privacy-preserving cooperative computation situation. We need to find solutions that allow Alice and Bob to jointly solve their combined n linear equations while not disclosing each person's private equations to the other.
Currently, to solve the above problems, a commonly adopted strategy is to assume the trustworthiness of the participants, or to assume the existence of a trusted third party. Such assumptions are quite strong and maybe infeasible, and clearly it is desirable to have solutions that do not rely on the complete trustworthiness of participants or third parties. Moreover, in certain situation, even though we could trust that the other parties will not use our private information against our wish, we cannot guarantee that their systems being secure enough to prevent our information from being stolen. On the other hand, from the trusted parties' point of view, in order to conduct such a cooperative computation, they have to carry the extra burden of securing other party's data. If a disgruntled employee or a security breach causes the compromise of the data, these trusted parties might face expensive lawsuits. Therefore, it is to the favor of every participants that nobody knows the other parties' secret information. Protocols that can support this type of joint scientific computations while protecting the participants' privacy are of growing importance.
In this paper, we introduce the privacy-preserving cooperative scientific computations (PPCSC) problem. The general definition of the PPCSC problem is that two or more parties want to conduct a scientific computation based on their private inputs, but neither party is willing to disclose its own input to anybody else (including a so-called trusted third party). We have further defined several specific PPCSC problems, including privacy-preserving cooperative linear system of equations (PPC-LSE) problem, and privacy-preserving cooperative linear least-square (PPC-LLE) problem, all of which involve a matrix.
There are several ways to share a matrix. Depending on how such a matrix is shared by Alice and Bob, or in another word how Alice and Bob cooperate with each other, the problems could appear in a variety of forms. The generalization of the PPCSC problem is referred to as Secure Multi-party Computation problem (SMC) in the literature [22] . Generally speaking, a secure multi-party computation problem deals with computing any probabilistic function on any input, in a distributed network where each participant holds one of the inputs, ensuring that no more information is revealed to a participant in the computation than can be computed from that participant's input and output [8] .
Goldreich states in [6] that the general secure multiparty computation problem is solvable in theory, but he also points out that using the solutions derived by these general results for special cases of multi-party computation can be impractical; special solutions should be developed for special cases for efficiency reasons. Motivated by this assertion, we are interested in seeking special solutions to the specific PPCSC problem, solutions that are more efficient than the general theoretic solutions.
In the rest of this paper, the next subsection presents the related work. Section 2 presents formal definition of the privacy. Section 3 describes the PPC-LSE, PPC-LLE protocols and their applications. Section 4 discusses the efficiency of these protocols. Section 5 summarizes the paper and lays out some future work. 
Security Definition
The history of the multi-party computation problem is extensive since it was introduced by Yao [22] and extended by Goldreich, Micali, and Wigderson [18] , and by many others. In the past, secure multi-party computation research has mostly been focusing on the theoretical studies, very few applied problems have been studied. Those few applied problems include Private Information Retrieval problem (PIR) [12, 3, 11, 10, 13, 17, 14, 91, Joint digital signature [21, 5] and joint decryption, elections over the Internet, electronic bidding [2] , and privacy-preserving data mining [16, 11.
1-out-of-N Oblivious Transfer
An 1-out-of-N Oblivious Transfer protocol [7, Their solution can achieve O ( m ) communication complexity, where m is the security parameter (i.e. the length of a number that is hard to factor). This protocol serves as an important building block for our protocols, and the ideas of using the 1-out-of-N Oblivious Transfer protocol as building block are pioneered by Naor and Pinkas in [ 191. The model for this work is that of general multi-party computation, more specifically between two semi-honest parties. Our formal definitions are according to Goldreich in [6] . We now present in brief the definition for general two-party computation of a functionality with semi-honest parties only. They are taken from [6] . Definition 2.1. (privacy w. r.t. semi-honest behavior): Let f : {0,1}* x {0,1}* I+ {O,l}* x {O,l}* be a functionality, where f1 (z, y)(resp., f 2 ( 2 , y) denotes the first (resp., second) element of f ( z , y ) , and ll be a twoparty protocol for computing f . The view of the first (resp., second) party during an execution of II on (z, y), denoted VIEWF(z, y) (resp., VIEW,"(z, y)), is ( z , r l , m i , . . . , m i ) (resp., ( y , r 2 , m f , . . . ,m:)), where r1 (resp., r 2 ) represents the outcome of the first (resp., second) party's internal coin tosses, and mt (resp., mp) represents the ith message it has received. The output of the first (resp., second) party during an execution of II on ( x , y ) , denoted OUTPUT?(x, y) (resp., OUTPUT,"(x, y)), is implicit in the party's view of the execution. 0 We say that 7r privately computes f if there exist polynomial time algorithms, denoted S 1 and S2 such that
where E denotes computational indistinguishability.
V I E W F ( x , y) and VIEW,"(x, y), OUTPUTF(a:, y) and OUTPUT,"(x, y) are related random variables, defined as a function of the same random execution.
Some Privacy-Preserving Cooperative Scientific Computations
In this section, we describe two related protocols for privacy-preserving cooperative scientific computation, including the protocols for the privacy-preserving cooperative linear system of equations (PPC-LSE) and privacypreserving cooperative linear least-square problem (PPC-LLS). We assume a finite field F , and all computations are over this finite field, meaning that entries of matrices (or vectors) are elements of a finite field and addition and multiplication are defined with respect to that field. As a result, this assumption makes the scope of the computations somewhat different than the original computations. Such an assumption is made to achieve the privacy requirements according to Goldreich's definitions [6] . We believe that dropping this finite field assumption is possible if different privacy requirements (defined in an infinite domain) can be used.
Two Models of Cooperation
A common property of the above PPC-LSE and PPC-LLE problems is the combining knowledge of a matrix M and of a vector b. We have described in Figure 1 three different ways of combining knowledge, with (b) and (c) being the special cases of (d). However, in real life, cases (b) and (c) are more meaningful than (d) because they tend to model the ways of actual cooperations.
In the PPC-LSE and PPC-LLE problems, M and b usually represent a set of linear constraints. Sometimes the cooperating parties each has its own set of constraints, but sometimes they have to jointly specify each single constraint. Therefore we classify the cooperation to two basic models, the heterogeneous model and the homogeneous model.
Model 1. (Homogeneous Model)
Alice has a matrix M1 and a vector bi; Bob has a matrix M2 and a vector b2. The size of M I is ml x n, the size of M2 is m2 x n ; the lengths of the vectors bl and b2 are ml and m2, respectively. Alice and Bob want to solve
The model could be transformed to the the following form: are n x n matrices; bl and b2 are n-dimensional vector.
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Bob generates two invertible random n x n matrices P and Q. where z is the input, T is the private coin tosses and mi the ith message received.
0 SI, upon input ( M I , 111') first chooses two invertible random matrices P' and Q' (these matrices simulate P and Q respectively). This protocol is similar to the protocol of evaluating MI.
and the security property can be proved similarly.
Protocol 3.
Alice has a vector b l , Bob has a vector b2 and a random matrix P .
1. Alice and Bob agree on two numbers p and m, such that pm is so big that conducting pm additions is computationally infeasible. m random vectors 2 1 , . . . , x,, such that bl = x1 + . . . + xm. 
Alice generates
Theorem 2. The protocol for coniputing b'
is private.
Theorem 3. PPC-LSE protocol is a protocol for privately computing the solution to the Linear System of Equations problem.
Based on the proof of the protocols for evaluat-
The design of the simulator S2 is similarly based on the simulators used in the proof of the protocols for evaluating
Privacy-Preserving Cooperative Linear
Least-Squares Problem
The linear system of equations problem consists of n equations of n unknown variables. There are situations where we have more equations to satisfy than the number of unknown variables. Most often, we cannot satisfy all of these equations, but we may find a solution that can satisfy them as best as we can. This problem is called the linear least-squares problem. We solve the privacy-preserving cooperative linear least-squares problem (PPC-LLS) in this subsection. Since there are more conditions (equations) to be satisfied than degrees of freedom (variables), it is unlikely that they can all be satisfied. Therefore, they want to attempt to satisfy the equations as best as they can-that is, make the size of the residual vector r with components where Rj is a random matrix.
Problem 2. (PPC-LLS)
(c) Using the 1-out-of-N Oblivious Transfer protocol, Alice gets back the result of 
where M i and M i are n x n matrices, and bi and bi are vectors of length n; M i and b: are known only to Alice, and Mi and bl, are known only to Bob. This is a PPC-LSE problem. It can be solved using the PPC-LSE protocol described in 3.2. 
Protocol 4. (Matrix Product Protocol
Alice and Bob use PPC-LSE protocol to solve
The linear least-squares problem are normally used in regression and mathematical modeling. Consider building an investment model for a financial organization. One example is to model customers' investment as a function of age. In such a case the bank knows or believes or hopes there are n different factors-all related to the age-that influence the customers' decision on investment, and the bank wants to build a mathematical model according to these n factors. Formally speaking, the bank want to find out the function b(t) = Cy=l z i f i ( t ) , where t is the variable representing the age, and fi(t) express the different age factors.
Suppose now that the bank takes a large number of observation from the data it collected, and obtains values bj for t values t j , j = 1,. . . ,m, and m > n. The problem of building such a mathematical model is just to solve the following linear least-square system:
There are times when one financial organization does not have the sufficient data to build such a mathematical model, it thereby needs to cooperate with another financial organization, who also wants to benefit from such a cooperation.
So both financial organizations would contribute their own data toward building such a model. Because this type of data usually consists of proprietary information that none of the financial organizations is willing to disclose to the others, these two financial organizations need to find a way to build the mathematical model without violating their privacy constraints. They can use PPC-LLS protocol.
Theorem 4. PPC-LLS protocol is a protocol for privately computing the solution to the Linear Least-Squares Problem.
The theorem is correct because the PPC-LLS protocol is reduced to the PPC-LSE protocol, which is already proved.
Protocol Efficiency
A Comparison to Generic Solutions.
The motivation of this research, i.e. designing specific solutions for each specific problems, is to reduce the communication cost. Therefore, in this section, we will compare the communication cost of our approach with that of the general solutions (the circuit evaluation approach)
For the PPC-LSE problem (and also for the PPC-LLE problem because it can be reduced to the PPC-LSE problem), assume the size of the matrix M is n x n, and the d is the maximum length to represent a number in F . Assume that Gaussian elimination method is used in both the PPC-LSE protocol and the general solution.
As we know that the cost of Gaussian elimination takes O(n3) multiplication operations. And by a rough estimate, the size of a secure circuit for a single multiplication is about O ( d 2 ) . Therefore, the total size of the circuit to conduct the Gaussian elimination is O(n3 * d2).
In the PPC-LSE protocol, the cost of communication is 
Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we have defined a set of new privacypreserving cooperative scientific computation problems: privacy-preserving cooperative linear system of equations problem and privacy-preserving cooperative linear leastsquare problem. We have developed protocols to solve these problems.
The major limitation of this work is due to the finite field assumption, which makes the computations in our paper somewhat different from the original scientific computations. In our future work, we would like to define a finite field that makes our computations consistent with the original scientific computations. Another alternative is to devise meaningful privacy requirements over infinite field, rather than using what Goldreich defined for a finite domain.
Rice points out that using M T M x = M T b to solve the linear least-square problem is not always the best approach, because it introduces the ill-conditioned matrix MTM-the condition number of M T M is the condition number of M squared [20] . In the case where condition number of M T M is too bad, the solution might be random numbers unrelated to the original problem. In those cases, other approachessuch as the Gram-Schmidt Orthogonalization approach and the Orthogonal Matrix Factorization approach-are better than the normal equations approach. Developing protocols to solve the least-square problem using these approaches is an avenue we could pursue in the future work. There are some other interesting scientific computation problems that we will study in the future work, such as how to compute eigenvalues, eigenvectors, determinants, conditions, and factorization of a matrix in the privacy-preserving cooperative computation situation.
